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The Chancery Court of Nova Scotia:
Jurisdiction and Procedure 1751-1855

Jim Cruickshank*
The Court of Chancery in Nova Scotia enjoyed a history that may
best be described as a progression from obscurity to infamy. During its
first half-century, the Court operated with an intermittent caseload and
remained out of the public eye. During its final years, the Court came
under increasing public criticism as an unnecessary and inefficient
institution. This criticism began as early as 1829, with Haliburton's
History of Nova Scotia.1 Joseph Howe contributed scathing editorials
against the Chancery in the popular press2 and in 1833 Beamish
Murdoch reviewed the Court and concluded in his Epitome of the Laws

of Nova Scotia:
Anyone who will deliberately read through the long,
unmeaning, but expensive forms of bills and answers in
Chancery, and the absurd and unnecessary processes of
contempt, as they are called, must be blinded by a
reverence for antiquity, ifhe does not think them unreasonable. Those who are (as clients) made acquainted
with the dilatory and unsatisfactory progress of any
business which goes into Chancery, will feel convinced
that there is something wrong in a system productive of
such results. 3
Twentieth Century historians have also focused on the shortcomings of the Court, although with a more detached perspective.4 This
paper seeks to delve behind these criticisms to ask two questions: what
did the Court do and how did it do it? This inquiry into jurisdiction and
procedure is undertaken with the criticisms of the Court in mind.
Indeed, I hope that an enhanced knowledge of the Court will bring its
shortcomings into historical focus.
The research for this paper involved an examination of the
original case files of the Court, along with various records kept by court
officials. From this data base, I have attempted to draw certain
conclusions about the Court's internal workings. This is a very narrow
focus and I readily concede that at times the analysis will (of necessity)
proceed in a historical vacuum. I have not attempted to compare the
workings of this court with the Supreme Court ofN ova Scotia at the time,
nor with contemporary courts of equity in other jurisdictions. Such a
comparative analysis will be necessary before broad conclusions with
respect to the Court of Chancery can be made with any certainty.
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Therefore, the results of this paper can best be characterized as a series
of interim hypotheses.
The paper begins with an overview of the Court of Chancery, based
on the work of historians to date. The results of my examination of
original court documents follows, separated into jurisdictional and
procedural categories. Finally, some conclusions and hypotheses will be
drawn and ideas for future research will be suggested.
The Court of Chancery 1751 - 1855
The court of Chancery was established coincident with the common law courts in Nova Scotia upon the foundation of Halifax in 1749.5
The Court sat only in Halifax, hearing some 1900 cases until its abolition
in 1855. The Governor of the province also held the status of Chancellor
and until the appointment of the first Master of the Rolls in 1825,6 the
Governor actually presided over all cases. The Governors had no legal
training, but were assisted by the Justices of the Supreme Court.7
The Court's history can be divided into several phases. Until 1814,
the Court heard relatively few cases. A dramatic increase in the Court's
caseload began after 1814, which may have been the reason for the
Master of the Roll's appointment in 1825. The criticisms of Chancery,
noted earlier, led to modest procedural reforms in 1833.s The period
which followed was one of relative stability for the Court, both in terms
of volume of work and public criticism.
Renewed calls for reform were heard beginning in the 1840s, this
time in the form of an abolitionist movement. This movement culminated in the fusion of the Court of Chancery with the common law courts
in 1855.9 The reform movement was not unique to Nova Scotia. The
inherent inefficiency of a dual system of justice led to radical procedural
reforms in England in 185210 and to the abolition of the New Brunswick
Court of Chancery in 1854.11
Existing Historical Studies
The first historical account of the Chancery Court is a paper
prepared by Charles Townshend in 1900.12 Townshend was a Justice of
Nova Scotia's Supreme Court and his essay is a valuable outline of the
history of the Court. His paper explores a few of the cases heard by the
Court, but for the most part focuses on a chronological overview of the
major events in its history. Townshend explicitly avoids delving into the
minutiae of the Court's procedure andjurisdiction, noting:
How [its] jurisdiction was exercised, what practice was
adopted, and the nature of the litigation coming before
the Court, it may safely be said, is at the present time
unknown.13
Townshend was the grandson of Alexander Stewart, the last
Master of the Rolls in Nova Scotia. Stewart was the defender of the Court
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of Chancery during the abolition debates of the 1850s and his own fate
as Master was the subject of considerable debate prior to passage of the
1855 fusion bill.1 4 As a result of this family connection, Townshend
brings a certain bias to the later history of the Court. His view of
Stewart's reforms is certainly optimistic 15 and he openly cheers his
grandfather's defence of the Court.16 Despite his bias with respect to the
final phase of the Court's history, Townshend's essay remains a useful
foundational history of the Court.
After Townshend's essay in 1900, historians did not focus on the
Court until a 1989 paper by Barry Cahill. 17 Cahill is a Manuscripts
Archivist at the Public Archives of Nova Scotia and his paper provides
an excellent supplement to Townshend's work. Cahill focuses on the
Chancery records as an archive collection, providing an in-depth examination of their sources, context, and usefulness. His work also provides
helpful biographical background with respect to many of the principal
figures in the Court's history.
A third work that touches on the Court is Philip Girard's paper on
Nineteenth Century law reform in Nova Scotia.18 Girard focuses on the
demise of the Court in the context of law reform and thus brings its
history into relief against a larger backdrop of contemporary sociopolitical trends.
In summary, historians to date have examined the Court in a
variety of contexts, but never with a focus on procedure and jurisdiction.
A substantive inquiry into the cases heard by the Court has to date not
been attempted. As a result, this research paper should provide an
inroad into an uncharted area of the Court's history.
Primary Sources
Historical studies of the Court of Chancery are facilitated by the
existence of a fairly complete collection of all of the actual case files of the
Court, along with a series of minute books and other memoranda.19
Barry Cahill's article provides an exhaustive description of the collection, which will not be repeated here. My research utilized a variety of
the documents in the collection, but principally relied on three sources.
Each of these is considered in turn.
The principal source for my investigation of Chancery jurisdiction
was the Court's Chronological List of Causes.20 This list records all
191721 Chancery cases in chronological.order. The listing indicates the
names of the parties to each action, the nature of the suit, a:nd the date
the action was started. This information is the basis for my analysis of
the annual case volume of the Court and the subject matter of cases
heard by the Court.
The Chronological List was prepared in 1837, and later updated
to 1855. Both the 1837 listing and update were prepared by a court
official, John McGregor, at the request of the Master of the Rolls.22
As historical evidence, McGregor's listing is very useful. Cahill
concludes that the listing was originally prepared for use by the Court
as an inventory of files and as a tool for scheduling current and semi-
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current records.23 As a contemporary document prepared for actual use
by the Court, the List is inherently reliable, accurate, and complete.
While McGregor's classification of cases is not always consistent, it is
nonetheless sufficiently accurate for the purposes of my summary of the
Court's jurisdiction.
The case files of the Court constitute my second major research
resource. Almost all of the 1,900 cases heard by the Court are available
for review.24 These provide a highly reliable source for examination of
the procedures of the Court. The completeness of many files cannot be
assured, however, as most files do not contain a trail of documents from
first complaint to final decree. Thus it is difficult to determine whether
an action was simply discontinued or whether documents have gone
missing. Two sources suggest that he former is most likely the case.
First, a Chancery practitioner's notebook indicates that a large number
of his cases were settled out of court.25 Second, a Court record of the
disposition of causes from 1832 to 1835 indicates a substantial number
of discontinued suits.26
My third major research source is the Chancery Rules of Practice. 27 This is a bound manuscript volume in three parts. The first part
contains the Irish "Rules & Practice of the High Court of Chancery". The
date and source of this listing is unknown, but it would appear to have
been used as a reference source for court officials. Both Townshend28 and
Cahi1129 speculate that the Nova Scotia Court simply adopted these Irish
Rules, as a complete set of domestic Nova Scotia rules was never
created.30 As part of my procedural inquiry, I have attempted to
determine whether the actual procedure of the Court corresponds with
these rules.
The second part of the Rules of Practice is a 'digest' of Irish
chancery law, including rules with commentary, as well as case reports
from 1640 to 1722. The third part contains the "Rules of Practice"
promulgated in Nova Scotia by the Chancellor pursuant to the Chancery
reform statute of 1833.31

The Jurisdiction of the Chancery Court
My inquiry into Chancery jurisdiction has two general branches.
The first is an assessment of the annual caseload handled by the Court.
The second considers the subject matter of those cases.
The annual volume of cases is summarized in Table I. A review of
these statistics suggests that three distinct volume phases can be
isolated. From 1751 to 1813, the Court heard very few cases. No more
than fourteen cases were heard in any one year and the average caseload
for this period was only four cases per year. After 1813, the volume of
cases rose sharply. The period from 1814 to 1828 was the busiest in the
Court's history, averaging fourty-six cases per year, with a peak of
eighty-four in 1822. Finally, the years from 1829 to 1855 proved to be a
period of stability and eventual decline in case volume, averaging thirtyseven cases per year.

31

CHANCERY COURT
An obvious conclusion arising from these statistics is that the
Court was never overworked. In all but a few years, the Court's work
could be heard at the leisurely pace ofless than one case per week. Critics
of the Master of the Rolls, whose annual salary (£600) equalled that of
the Chief Justice of the province, 32 were perhaps justified in questioning
the value of this position.
Table I
Annual Number of Causes in Chancery

1751
1752
1753
1754
1755
1756
1757
1758
1759
1760
1761
1762
1763
1764
1765
1766
1767
1768
1769
1770
1771
1772
1773
1774
1775
1776
1777
1778
1779
1780
1781
1782
1783
1784
1785

2
2
4
0
2
0
1
0
0
0
2
0
1
2
4
0
0
3
4
1
2
1
0
4
2
2
5
5
4
5
4
3
4
1
4

Total Number of Causes

1786
1787
1788
1789
1790
1791
1792
1793
1794
1795
1796
1797
1798
1799
1800
1801
1802
1803
1804
1805
1806
1807
1808
1809
1810
1811
1812
1813
1814
1815
1816
1817
1818
1819
1820

10
7
7
3
5
7
10
2
0
2
2
3
4
4
0
4
3
6
10
5
2
8
3
8
5
9
14
6
11
25
20
38
42
54
46

1821
1822
1823
1824
1825
1826
1827
1828
1829
1830
1831
1832
1833
1834
1835
1836
1837
1838
1839
1840
1841
1842
1843
1844
1845
1846
1847
1848
1849
1850
1851
1852
1853
1854
1855

55
84
58
45
43
53
57
52
37
36
29
28
44
43
55
34
49
43
42
30
26
51
34
27
35
33
44
54
58
42
31
40
28
25

--11.
1,917

The volume statistics also lead to the surprising conclusion that
the volume of cases did not increase steadily over time. As the economy
of the province grew, and particularly with the onset of Nova Scotia's
'Golden Age' in the 1840s, one would have expected the volume of
litigation to increase correspondingly. Townshend appears to proceed on
this assumption when he concludes that ".. .in its latter years [the Court]
was kept busily employed."33 To the contrary, the peak of annual case

32

DALHOUSIE JOURNAL OF LEGAL STUDIES
volume occurred in 1822 and the final years of the Court saw a marked
decline in case volume. Several hypotheses can be advanced to explain
these volume patterns. The first is an economic analysis and the second
relates to litigation psychology.
Because some seventy-six per cent of causes heard in Chancery
were mortgage foreclosures (see Table II), the volume of cases in any one
year should be inversely related to the prosperity of the province. In
difficult times, the number of foreclosures would be expected to increase.
Analysis of the data from the Chronological List supports this assertion.
The peak volume era of the Court, from 1814 to 1828, corresponds
to a period of worldwide financial uncertainty. in particular, the years of
1811, 1820, and 1826 saw economic downturns.3 4 Postulating a one or
two year lag between a downturn (when debtors would stop payments)
and the start of foreclosure actions, one would expect to find a surge in
the number of Chancery causes in the years following these economic
downturns. The caseload statistics support such a correlation. 1812 was
the Court's busiest year to date, 1822 was the highest volume year ever,
and 1827 was the second busiest year of the peak 1819 to 1828 decade.
This explanation of case volumes can be further tested by examining the increase in the proportion of foreclosure actions in each of the
high volume years noted above. While the historical proportion of
mortgages was seventy-six per cent, the proportion in 1822 was eightynine per cent, and in 1827 was eighty-three per cent. This suggests that
high volume years were the result of a surge in foreclosure actions.
However, in 1812, only fifty per cent of the actions were foreclosures.
This contradicts my thesis, but the relatively small sample size in 1812
may explain the deviation in that year.
A 'litigation psychology' theory can also be advanced to explain
certain unique caseload fluctuations. The two major reforms of the Court
in 1833 and 1855 were both preceded by vigorous public attacks on the
Court and by a decline in case volume. I would hypothesize that litigants
were avoiding the Court when its shortcomings were on the public
agenda.
The nature of Chancery litigation was such that cases could be
kept out of Court. Mortgagees, for example, could be more tolerant of
indigent debtors. One case file indicates that litigants were mindful of
the cost of a Chancery action. In Annand v. McHeffey ,35 the executors of
a disputed will state, in their Bill for Settlement, that they had pleaded
with the beneficiaries to settle their differences so that the expense of a
Suit of Settlement could be avoided. Given the discretionary nature of
Chancery litigation, it is possible that the parties moved to more
informal dispute settlement mechanisms during the periods of public
criticism of the Court.
The second branch of my jurisdictional research examines the
subject matter of cases litigated in Chancery. I have summarized the
1,917 entries of the Chronological List by major subject categories in
Table II. A further breakdown of miscellaneous cases is provided in
Table III.
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The most apparent conclusion arising from a review of Table II is
the predominance of foreclosure actions as the major business of the
Court. The percentage of foreclosure actions rose steadily from sixtyeight per cent of all causes prior to 1822, to a high of eighty-three per cent
of cases heard after 1845. The high proportion of foreclosure actions
leads to a further conclusion that criticism of Chancery as an unnecessary duplication of common law litigation was overstated. Foreclosure
actions originated in Chancery and involved no duplication of the

"

Table I I
Analysis of Causes by Subject Matter

1751
to
1821

1822
to
1833

1834
to
1845

1846
to
1855

Total

350

446

355

309

1460

Injunctions
Injunctions
Specific Performance

58

24
2

11
5

7
8

100
18

Accounts
Unspecified
In Partnership
Miscellaneous

14
10
13

31
1

12
2

1

2

4

2

58
13
21

2

13
1

17

37

4

2

5
1
3

1

1
1

3

5
4
3
7
6
4

Foreclosures

Probate
Settlement of Estate
Intestate Distribution
Miscellaneous
Property
Trustee Appointment •
Action Against Trustee
Dower
Redemption
Partition
Settle Partnership
Family
Inquiry into Lunacy
Possession of Children
Guardian Appointment
Interim Relief
Certiorari/Prohibition
Discovery
Ne Exeat Regno
Directions
Procedure
Cross Bill
Reviver
Amended Bill

3

2

1

2

1
6

11

1

1

3
9

2
2

2

2
2

3

7
1
3

1

22
1

2

5

1

1

2

5
1
3

5

13
9

1

4

2

5

2
1

2

5
5

1

2

2

3
8

12
10
5

Other (see Table III)

__§.§.

Total

lill
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common law. The same was true for several other frequently litigated
heads of Chancery jurisdiction in Nova Scotia. In short, these statistics
suggest that only a handful of cases each year actually resulted in
duplication of common law litigation.
After foreclosures, the second largest group of cases heard in
Chancery is injunctions, generally consisting of a Writ of Injunction to
halt a common law proceeding.36 The frequency of injunction actions
showed a marked decline after 1833.37 Rule 17 banned injunctions
restraining a common law action unless applied for at least ten days
prior to the start of the Supreme Court term in which the common law
action was to be heard. 38 This rule appears to have been aimed at the use
of injunctions as a stalling tactic in common law actions. The relative
scarcity ofinjunction actions after 1833 (less than one per year) suggests
that the rule was a success. This also adds further weight to the assertion
that a separate Court of Chancery did not lead to a serious duplication
of common law litigation.
The traditional equitable remedy of specific performance was
litigated quite rarely as an independent action, appearing only eighteen
times during the entire history of the Court. However, specific performance may have been a collateral remedy sought in conjunction with suits
labelled by McGregor as some other form of action.
Actions for an account of profits saw a marked decline after 1833.
This decline may be explained by the thirty year hiatus between
McGregor's cataloguing sessions. McGregor may have forgotten the
classification subtleties used in first effort, resulting in a slightly
different classification for cases from 1837 to 1855. As actions for an
accounting are often combined with other remedial requests, the category is particularly susceptible to such misclassification.
The Court's jurisdiction over probate matters was a varied one. A
separate system of Probate Courts was operating at the time39 and the
Chancery apparently acted as a form of probate appeal court. 40 However,
the bulk of 'probate' work by the Chancery Court related to actions to
settle estates which originated in Chancery. The jurisdiction might best
be described as one of concurrent originaljurisdiction with the Probate
Courts. For example, an 1833 will granting a life estate was proved in
Colchester Probate Court in 1835 with respect to the life estate, but came
before the Court of Chancery in 1840 to be settled with respect to the
residual estate.41
There was surprisingly little work for Chancery in the traditional
equitable jurisdiction of trusts. Only nine actions appointing trustees
were heard. I can only speculate as to reasons for this inactivity. In a
relatively young colony, there may have been little accumulated wealth
to be held in trust. However, the number of actions settling estates of
significant value contradicts this theory.42
Another traditional head of equity jurisdiction was the action for
discovery. While used infrequently as an independent action (only
thirteen such cases are noted), requests for discovery were an almost
routine adjunct to every action in Chancery. The standard pleading
would include the boilerplate plea:
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[Your Orator is] unable to obtain the necessary proof
required by the strict rules of evidence in [the Common
Law] Courts and hath no relief but a Court of equity
where matters of this kind are cognizable and where
your Orator is entitled to a discovery of facts on the oath
of the Defendant.
Discovery took the form of written Interrogatories, discussed below
under the procedure of the Court.
The Writ of Ne Exeat Regno operated as an equivalent to the
modern Mareva Injunction. If a creditor suspected that a debtor was
about to leave the jurisdiction, an application for the writ would be heard
Table III
Analysis of Other Causes by Subject Matter
1751

to
1821

Unclassified Relief
Missing
Unknown
Appoint Auditors
Relief from Contract
Relief Against Fraud
Relief from Payment
Relief from Note
Complaint
Receiver
Guardian to Account
Account/Set Aside Sale
Compel Payment
Sciri Faci
Sell Lunatic's Stock
Recognizance of Faith
Mortgage as Evidence
Compel Annuity Payment
Establish Partnership
Payment of Surplus
Perpetuate Testimony
Petition of Probate
Set Aside Award
Cancel Mortgage
Maintenance Petition
Insurance Money
Petition for Priority
Deliver Possession
Contribution to Surety
Retain Realty
Executor for Security
Set Aside Conveyance
Annuity
Restore Possession
Cancel Deed
Set Aside Title
Account of Rents
Information
Total

1822

1834

to

to

1833

1845

.!.ill

10

3
5
3

2

18
2

1
1
1
2

3
1

1846

to

21

2

19
8
2

1
2

1

1
1
3

1

4

1

1
1
1
1
1
1
1

1
1
1

1

Total

3
1
7
1
1

1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
2

1

1
1

1
1

1

1

2

1
2

1

1
2
1
1
1
1

1

2

2

1
1

1
1

1
1
1
1
1
1

1

1
1
2
1
1
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ex parte on the affidavit of the creditor. If the application was successful,
the debtor would be imprisoned until the writ was answered and security
filed with the Court.43 The writ was used quite frequently in the early
years of the Court, but only once thereafter. I would hypothesize that as
litigants became confident in the Court's ability to proceed with actions
in the absence of the Defendant, 44 the perceived need for the writ
declined.
The committal of insane persons (Inquiry into Lunacy) was a
relatively frequent action in the early years of the Court. The decline of
this action in later years may have resulted from some statutory
alternative to an action in Chancery, although I am not aware of any
specific legislation on this point.
The broad range of the Court's jurisdiction is demonstrated in
Table III, which lists those actions which were only infrequently litigated in Chancery. No particular trends can be noted here, although it
is perhaps surprising that the 'variety' of causes did not increase as the
province's society became more complex. In fact, the number of 'other
causes' heard in Chancery remains quite static over the century.

Procedure of the Court
The primary source for my study of the procedure of the Court is
a sample of twenty case files.45 This source is supplemented by various
records and memoranda prepared by Court officials. My objectives in
reviewing the case files are to develop a sense of the Court's methodology,
to determine the consistency of practice over time, and to assess the
criticisms of the Court in light of its actual practice.
While I did not focus on the actual substance of the matters
litigated in the twenty cases sampled, a synopsis of the cases is presented
inAppendixA. The most obvious pattern that emerges from the synopsis
is that large sums of money were usually at stake in Chancery litigation.
In those cases in my sample which involved a monetary sum, the average
amount at issue was over £700.
One interesting aspect of my procedural inquiry is the source of
procedural norms for the Court. As discussed earlier,46 historians have
speculated that Ireland's Chancery Rules of Practice were adopted as
the basis for Nova Scotia procedure. This speculation is buttressed by the
fact that the province's first two Chief Justices were the Irish bar.47
However, there is no explicit historical evidence to prove that the Irish
Rules were in fact adopted. Therefore, in reviewing the case files I have
attempted to correlate actual court procedure with the Irish Rules48 as
a means of verifying their use in Nova Scotia.
My review of procedure can be grouped into two areas: pleadings
and court practice.

Pleadings
Actions in Chancery were initiated by filing a Bill of Complaint.
The Bill describes the complaint, the remedy sought, and the factual
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background to the case. The Answer of the Defendant is usually a mere
formal denial of the Bill, although it sometimes presents an alternative
view of the facts. The basic form of these pleadings is familiar to a modern
lawyer, with a recital of facts followed by a claim for relief. The style of
cause is typically noted in a 'backer' to the pleadings, a practice which
continues to this day in Nova Scotia.
The language and form of pleadings changed little in the 105 year
history of the court. This consistency suggests some norm of pleadings
was adhered to. Standard phraseology recurs throughout the years and
between different draftsmen. For example, each Bill concludes with the
plea that the Complainant "... hath no relief but a Court of Equity where
matters of this kind are cognizable and where your Orator is entitled
to ... "49
The structure and classification of pleadings is completely consistent with the Irish Rules.50 One aspect of the Irish Rules which did not
survive in Nova Scotia was the terminology for the 'complainant'. The
Irish Rules explicitly state that the "persons complaining are normally
called plaintiffs."51 However, Chancery practice in Nova Scotia consistently avoids this term, referring only to 'complainants' and in the
pleadings themselves to 'Your Orator'.
A troublesome rigidity in Chancery pleadings was the practice of
stating accusations in the Bill as alleged facts and then repeating the
allegation in the form of interrogatories to be asked on Discovery. This
practice led to Bills which routinely ran to a length of forty or more large
manuscript pages.52 The practice may have been considered necessary
by cautious practitioners to ensure that all necessary interrogatories
were allowed at Discovery. However, I was unable to find any Irish Rule
which restricted interrogatories to those questions explicitly stated in
the Bill.
The Court attempted a reform of Pleadings in its 1833 Rules. Rule
9 clarified that one general interrogatory is sufficient to compel an
answer to every material allegation in the Bill.53 Some practitioners
complied with the Rule, as in the following pleading:
[Plea that the] Defendants may upon their several and
respective corporal oaths true full and perfect answers
muster to all and singular the premises as if the same
were herein again repeated and they [were] thereto
particularly interrogated ... 54
However, many pleadings continued to detail individual interrogatories,
although the particular questions are generally restricted to matters not
already alleged in the BilI.55
Practitioners' compliance with the new rule is understandable, as
the Court refused after 1833 to tax costs for unnecessarily lengthy
pleadings:
... useless repetitions and prolixity in the Pleadings to be
avoided in all cases, and no allowance to be made for
them in the taxation of costs [Rule 13].56
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It is noteworthy that the Irish Rules contain a similar prohibition
against 'useless repetition', 57 although the enforcement mechanism of
refusing to tax costs is not mentioned.
The form of Defendants' Answers was as consistent over time as
the Bills of Complaint. The Answers universally began with the standard phrase:

The Defendants now and at all times hereafter saving
and reserving to themselves all and all manner ofbenefit
of advantage and exception to the manifold errors,
imperfection, uncertainties and insufficiencies in the
said Bill of Complaint contained for answer thereunto or
unto or so much thereof as these Defendants are advised
it is adjudged material or necessary for them to make
answer unto answering say that ... 58
This form may have been a convenient response to the Irish Rules, which
require the Defendant to answer each charge in the Bill or risk conceding
the charge. 59
Early pleadings generally allege fraud and conspiracy, 60 although
no such prerequisite can be found in the Irish Rules. The allegation was
likely included so that unnamed parties could be Discovered after the
close of pleadings. As well, an allegation of fraud may have been
perceived as a prerequisite to equitable jurisdiction. This anomaly in
pleading was addressed in the 1833 Rules, which ordered "No averment
of combinations or pretence shall be made in any Bill, except in cases
where an actual combination took place."61

Court Practice
The Court's involvement in a case begins with the issue of a
subpoena to compel the appearance of the Defendant. The Irish Rules
with respect to subpoenas62 appear to have been adopted in Nova Scotia.
It is interesting that the Irish Rules grant extra time for response to a
subpoena for Defendants living more than twenty miles outside Dublin63
and an identical twenty mile zone was established in Nova Scotia in the
1833 reform.64
Virtually every court file contains a subpoena, which generally
required an appearance to answer the Bill within fourteen days. Many
of the subpoenas appear to have been ignored with impunity. Files which
I examined often indicate a long delay from service to the appearance
date of the Defendant and there was no apparent penalty imposed by the
Court.65
The 1833 Rules attempted to address the subpoena problem by
setting clear deadlines for a response to service.66 However, Defendants
continued to delay. In an 1840 Action, an August 24 subpoena was
responded to by a Solicitor's Appearance the following January 30, and
Answers were not filed until Contempt of Court proceedings were
started in September of 1841. 67Similar delays are noted in other cases. 68
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While formality of pleadings was maintained, there was apparently some room for flexibility. In one case, a mortgagor succeeded in
delaying foreclosure proceedings by a direct appeal to the Chancellor.
Master Cogswell responded on the Chancellor's behalf:
Notwithstanding the irregularity and impropriety of
addressing papers to His Excellency in his Capacity as
Chancellor relative to the merits of a suit placed in a
course of judicial investigation in the Court of Chancery,
His Excellency has been induced in consideration of your
alleged distress and inability to fee Counsel at the time
to suspend proceedings until you could have a reasonable time for the purpose.69
Cogswell continues on to advise the Defendant of the risk of defending
the suit too strenuously, as the "expense of litigation will fall upon
you."70
The procedure for Interrogatories in Nova Scotia appears to have
followed the Irish Rules. 71 Independent Commissioners were appointed
to administer the written questions and record the answer of the
witness. The Irish Rules appear to forbid general Interrogatories,72
however, Nova Scotia did not follow this practice. An 1814 case required
fourteen Interrogatories, the last in the following form:
Do you know of any other matter or Thing which can
tend to the Benefit of or advantage of the Complaint in
the above cause, if [so] you [are to] relate the same
especially and particularly as if the same were herein set
down, and you thereto [were] particularly interrogated. 73
The Chancery reform legislation of 1833 allowed for examination
of witnesses viva voce "when and as the said Court shall think proper" ,74
but did not ban the use of Interrogatories. None of the post-1833 files
which I examined included written Interrogatories, although each Bill
continued the practice of requesting them. Therefore the extent of oral
examination of witnesses after 1833 is unclear.
The final ruling of the court in each cause takes the form of a
decree. These are often lengthy75 because a thorough recital of the
allegations of the parties is included. Unfortunately the decrees do not
provide any reasoning to support the judgment of the Court.
A sense of the nature of Chancery hearings is obtained from a
review of the various minute books kept by the court's officials. The
records note in outline form the matters heard at each sitting of the
Court. A review of the 1847 Minute Book76 indicates that the court sat
on only thirty-five days during that year. The hearings were often
scheduled for Tuesdays, on an as needed basis. Sittings were held in
every month of the year except March, with the autumn months being
the busiest. On a typical hearing day motions might be heard on as many
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as six cases. I would speculate that the sittings might have resembled a
modern day Supreme Court Chambers session.
The Court's practice in a number of specific areas indicates a clear
correlation to the Irish Rules. Each of these areas is examined in turn.
The Irish Rules required the Answer of the Defendant to be
provided upon oath. 77 This was the general practice in all Nova Scotia
cases, but in Storey v. Wallace the Answer was provided without oath.
The irregularity of this occurrence is evidenced by the Complainant's
certification that he would accept the Answer without Oath.78
When a Complainant seeks relief because a note evidencing a debt
has been lost, Irish Rule 30 required an affidavit swearing to the truth
of the circumstances surrounding the loss of the note. In McElhinney v.
Dickson,79 such an affidavit is attached to the Bill of Complaint, the only
case of the twenty which I reviewed in which such an affidavit was filed.
Further evidence of compliance with the Irish Rules is the use of
Appearance Notices by Counsel to seek leave of the Court for additional
time to prepare the Defendant's Answer, as required by Irish Rule 50.80
Final evidence of a correlation is found in Wood v. Sparrow 81, where a
Writ of Ne Exeat Regno was issued following procedure exactly in
conformity with Irish Rule 73.
Much has been made of the prominence of the lawyers who
appeared before Chancery. Townshend observed that many were prominent politicians or future Judges. His conclusion:
The well-known reputation of these lawyers is a sufficient guarantee that, especially in later times, the matters litigated in the Court of Chancery must have been
tried with learning and accurate knowledge of equity
jurisprudence. 82
A less benevolent conclusion is that a small clique of Halifax lawyers had
monopolized the Chancery practice. Contemporary criticism on exactly
this point is documented in Professor Girard's paper.83
The monopoly of Chancery practice manifested itself in a distinction made in Chancery between 'solicitors' and 'counsel'. While Nova
Scotia never had a 'split bar' in which solicitors would refer court work
to barristers, a specialized practice approaching such a split bar appears
to have developed in Chancery. Pleadings were typically signed by both
a solicitor and Counsel84 and the records of a Chancery practitioner note
a referring solicitor for each case. 85 This formally recognized specialist
bar does not appear to have been emphasized by previous historians.
A recurring criticism of the Court was the cost oflitigation.86 Of
my sample of twenty cases, only three included the taxed solicitor's costs.
Of these three (all foreclosures), the average solicitor's taxed fee was
£ 70, representing about ten per cent of the value of the property being
foreclosed.8 7 Legal fees of this magnitude appear high by today's standards and the basic foreclosure and sale process in Chancery appears
similar to that in use in Nova Scotia today. In addition to lawyer's fees,
parties were required to pay court fees. These were typically about£ 6,

41

CHANCERY COURT
with approximately£ 2 allocated to each of the Chancellor, Master, and
Registrar. 88
Another criticism of the Court was the delay which it imposed on
litigation. However, case file data does not support this criticism. Eight
of the twenty case files I examined proceeded to final decree, and the
average time from Bill of Complaint to Decree was just over twelve
months.89 Another sample of cases can be drawn from the Return of
Causes prepared by the Registrar of the Court for 1832,90 which indicates that twenty-four of twenty-nine causes were brought to a conclusion, at an average duration of seven months. The Registrar noted an
explanation beside most causes delayed for more than a year. Typical
explanations were that the Court's costs had not been paid or that the
matter remained outstanding in the hands of the litigants. Excluding
those causes with such an explanation, the average duration of cases
drops to five and one-half months.
The statistics on case duration do not indicate an unduly protracted litigation system. In light of the time allowed for Defendants to
respond to service (thirty days within Halifax and sixty days otherwise),
a five and one-half month case duration does not justify the criticism
levelled at the Court.
Certain actions by Chancery litigants might today be perceived as
delaying tactics, but these were actually intrinsic to the Court's procedure. Townshend's comment on one case illustrates this misconception:
The defendants appear to have invoked all sorts of
devices to delay the complainant and to impede the
progress of the cause. Demurrer was filed, motions
made, examiners appointed, evidence taken under interrogatories, references made to the Master, reports
thereon, exceptions thereto; but finally the [Plaintiffi
prevailed .... 91
What Townshend viewed as delaying tactics were, of course, typical
proceedings in almost any Chancery action.
Conclusion
Because the focus of research for this paper was quite narrow, it
is appropriate that my conclusions be temperate. In general, the data
surveyed has produced a reliable picture of Chancery practice and
jurisdiction, however, this picture will only be brought into proper focus
after additional comparative research is completed. In the same sense,
the historical significance of my findings will only be measurable after
this additional research has been completed.
With respect to the criticisms of the Court, I would hypothesize
that these were justified with respect to the costs of litigation and the
inherent inefficiency of an institution that simply did not have a large
volume of work. However, I would suggest that the criticisms as to delay
and duplication were overstated. The nature of cases litigated in Chan-
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cery indicate that duplication was not a widespread problem, and the
time required to complete most cases suggests that the Court was
relatively effective in managing its modest caseload. Again, these conclusions need to be tested in a comparative analysis with other tribunals,
particularly the Supreme Court of Nova Scotia.
In the area of practice and procedure, I would conclude that the
Irish Rules ofPractice were the basis for Nova Scotian practice and were
followed consistently throughout the history of the Court. This conclusion is based on the empirical evidence obtained by comparison of actual
procedure to the rules themselves. This evidence is persuasive, but not
completely conclusive. While a strong correlation with the Irish Rules
exists, it is unclear whether other potential sources for rules would also
correlate strongly with Nova Scotian practice. However, the bulk of
historical evidence supports the Ireland connection.
With respect to the jurisdiction of the Court, the predominance of
actions that did not stem from a common law suit supports the hypothesis that criticism of this duplication of common law proceedings may
have been overstated. In addition, the predominance of foreclosure
actions and the scarcity of actions under other traditional equitable
heads of jurisdiction suggests that the Court's development was curtailed at a stage of relative immaturity.

Suggestions for Further Research
As discussed above, the research reported in this paper should
serve as a foundation for a number of divergent inquiries, each of which
could test and explore my hypotheses. Some particular areas ofresearch
are noted here for future reference.
1. A comparative analysis of Nova Scotian Chancery procedure
with the procedure of equity courts in other jurisdictions (and with Nova
Scotia's Supreme Court) will place my research into context. Particular
areas to focus on would include the duration and expense of litigation.
2. A comparison of the practice and pleadings of the Nova Scotia
Chancery to those in Ireland after 1751 would be an interesting comparative analysis. An interesting question is the extent to which Ireland's practice developed in new directions after its export to Nova
Scotia.
3. A comparison of the substantive decisions of Chancery to those
of other jurisdictions may well be impossible. Unfortunately, most
Chancery files give no information about the legal reasoning that
supports a Decree. Any analysis in this area would have to proceed on a
deductive approach, surveying a large number of cases on one topic, and
imputing a rule oflaw from the case results. Given the limited number
of cases under most heads of jurisdiction, there may be insufficient data
available to complete this kind of analysis in Nova Scotia.
4. Analysis of the legislative debates leading to fusion may well be
enhanced by the findings in this paper. The arguments advanced by both
sides may be more critically assessed in light of the empirical data
provided by my research.
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5. A comparison of the Chancery jurisdiction before and after
fusion could be undertaken. Professor Girard notes that there are
unanswered questions surrounding the post-fusion period92 and these
questions could be explored in the context of a procedural comparison to
the pre-fusion era.
6. Further studies of the correlation between foreclosure actions
and the provincial economy would serve as a test of my hypothesis on this
point and could shed light on the utility of foreclosures as a debt
collection mechanism.
7. The background and training of Chancery lawyers could be
investigated. While the volume of litigation could not have supported
full-time equity practitioners, the degree of specialization could be
assessed. As well, the ties between generations of Chancery lawyers
could be examined to determine how equity practices evolved.
8. Analysis of litigants would provide an interesting profile of
economic and commercial relations in the province. One hypothesis
could query the extent to which litigation is restricted to the commercial
classes of Halifax and the rural propertied class.
9. The procedure and practice of the Masters in Chancery was not
a focus of my research, but could be profitably reviewed.

Appendix A
Synopsis of Cases Examined (Chronological Order)

Turnbull v. Smith (1782) PANS 57. Action to compel payment of a debt.
Paymaster of Halifax Garrison advances £1, 100 in lieu of payment owing
by a Halifax banker. Banker dies and his heirs refuse to honour the debt
owing to the Garrison. Solicitors: Attorney General Gibbons, Solicitor
General Uniacke.
Wood v. Sparrow (1782) PANS 58. Application for Ne Exeat Regno.
Halifax merchant agreed to advance £200 to an artillery regiment at a
discount rate of two per cent. Market rates increased to ten per cent, and
the merchant planned to leave Nova Scotia without advancing the loan.
The merchant was imprisoned pursuant to the Writ for one month, and
released after filing security with the Court. Solicitors: Mr. Fitzgerald,
R.J. Uniacke.
Roach v. Converse (1810) PANS 186. Foreclosure oflands in Cumberland
county mortgaged for £800. Solicitors: Lewis Wilkins, Crofton Uniacke.
Foreman v. Campbell (1810) PANS 188. Foreclosure of mortgaged lands
in Guysborough. The debt secured by the mortgage was for £3,000.
Solicitor: Thomas Ritchie.
Wollenhauht v. Webster et al. (1811) PANS 188. Injunction to stop a
common law debt action, and for an account. A Lunenburg merchant
purchased goods from a London merchant for £700, giving a note in
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payment to the London merchant's agent, and guaranteeing the payment by the London merchant to third party suppliers in England. The
London merchant went bankrupt, defaulting on his payment to third
party suppliers, and the Lunenburg merchant made good on his guarantee. The Halifax agent now seeks to collect the original note on behalf of
the bankrupt. Solicitor: Crofton Uniacke.

Delesdernier v. Stanner (1812) PANS 197. Action for Dower. The Complainant's husband mortgaged a Windsor property which was foreclosed
in 1773 despite the Complainant's Dower interest. The Complainant
now seeks compensation for her Dower interest. The deed evidencing her
husband's ownerchip of the property was lost during the American
attack on Fort Cumberland in 1776. Solicitor: R.J. Uniacke.
Creighton v. Schner (1814) PANS 212. Bill to perpetuate testimony. A
witness to a disputed Lunenburg will was near death. A commission was
appointed to take interrogatories and file the responses with the Court.
Solicitors: T.B. Robie, J.A. Stewart.
McElhinney v. Dickson (1824) PANS 643. Action seeking relief from the
common law and discovery. A Londonderry farmer loaned money to the
Defendant's father, an Onslow shipbuilder. The Defendant was a member of the provincial House of Assembly. The Complainant lost the note
evidencing the debt of £400, and the Defendant denies existence of the
debt, which is now not provable at common law. Solicitors: W. Johnson,
William Hill.
Chipman et al. v. Beckwith (1825) PANS 644. Foreclosure of mortgaged
lands in Cornwallis. The Defendant had borrowed £485 from the Plaintiffs, who were Cornwallis merchants. Solicitor: W. Johnson.
The King v. Leaver (1825) PANS 1897. Action of Scire Faci to revoke
Letters Patent. A Crown grant of land in Sydney was conditional upon
the land being used for a school. As the school did not transpire, the
province sought revocation of the grant. Solicitors: Attorneys General
Uniacke (1825) and Archibald (1832).
Re Eleanor Francis (1836) PANS 1902. Petition for a new commisioner
to act as guardian for Eleanor Francis, who has been an 'idiot' since 1824.
Donaldson v. Davis (1837) PANS 1179. Bill for Directions from the
Court. The creditor has a lien on the Pictou house of an absconded debtor,
in the amount of £500, and seeks to eject the current occupants of the
house. Solicitors: Thomas Akins, Henry Blackader.
Harvie v. Chandler et al. (1837) PANS 1206. Action to settle the estate
of a Halifax landowner. The will had left a life estate to the deceased's
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wife and the remainder to seven children. Two issues were decided by the
Court. (1) One son predeceased his mother, leaving a wife and six
children. Their interest in the remainder is contested, as the estate had
not vested at the time of his death. The Court ruled in favour of the son's
heirs. (2) A daughter and her husband had assigned her interest in the
remainder to a trust for their children to evade an assignment made by
the husband to a creditor under the Insolvent Debtors Act. The Court
ruled that the daughter's interest in the remainder was a legal interest
which vested in her husband upon their marriage, and that the assignment to the trust was a fraudulent conveyance. The Court upheld the
trust corpus, but ruled that the assignee under the I nsoluent Debtors Act
had a first claim on the income of the trust. Solicitors: James F. Gray,
Charles Young.

Annand v. McHeffey (1840) PANS 1331. Settlement of the estate of a
Shubenacadie farmer. This was the only case examined in which parties
settled out of court andilled a Settlement Agreement with the Court.
Solicitor: George Young. Counsel: William Young, James Stewart, Charles
Twinning.
Bernardi et al. v. Heckman (1841) PANS 1348. Action against the
administrator of an Estate for an accounting. Complainants are the
heirs in Italy of a Lunenburg merchant. The administrator was a
creditor of the deceased. The case includes two competing wills, one
drawn under Italian civil law, and the other in Nova Scotia. Solicitor:
William Young. Counsel: George Young, James Gray.
Storey v. Wallace (1842) PANS 1367. Bil ofRevivor to continue an action,
which had abated on the death of the Complainant. Soliciotrs: James
Gray (also of Counsel), Charles Twinning.
Re Joanna Herbert et al. (1846) PANS 1530. Petition for guardianship.
A widow in Dartmouth seeks a guardian for her children so that their
interest in the family home (received on intestacy of their father) can be
mortgaged to pay the debts of the father's estate.
Uniacke v. Eustace (1846) PANS 1531. Foreclosure of a Halifax property
for a debt of £170. The Complainant is James B. Uniacke, who is acting
as his own solicitor, but with other counsel (J.W. Ritchie, James Gray).
Chisholm v. Johnston (1847) PANS 1547. Injunction to stop a common
law debt action. Complainant purchased land in Sydney from the
Defendnt, and issued a £320 note in consideration therefore. Defendant
did not have good title to the property, yet still sought to collect on the
note at common law. Solicitor: Mr. Sawers.
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Goldsmith v. Slocumb (1849) PANS 1640. Foreclosure ofland in Wilmot.
The underlying debt of £100 was owed to a mortgagee in Annapolis.
Solicitor: George Milledge. Counsel: J.W. Ritchie.
1991 law graduate, Dalhousie University.
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